Weekly Forecasts 7/2026
Special Issue on the Iran-U.S. (Israel) war
Contents:
Why the Persian Gulf theater is highly unfavorable to the U.S. in any conflict with Iran (by Patricia Marins)
The strategic depth of Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.
What does President Trump want with Iran?
Conclusion: assessment on the likelihood of a war.
This week, we’ll concentrate on the looming war between the Israel-U.S. vs. Iran. Two weeks ago, we sketched a worst-case scenario for Israel with Brazil-based geopolitical analysts, Patrician Marins. This week we’ll continue to cooperate with her by digging deeper into the conflict. We provide this information to you, because the grave threat Iran would pose to the U.S. in the case of a full-scale conflict, has not been explained practically anywhere.
We start with a piece by Patricia detailing why the Iran holds a formidable upper-hand in any full-scale naval (aerial) conflict with the U.S.-Israel axis. The main point of her piece is that we have seen only a glimpse of the capabilities of Iran, which are being downplayed by the mainstream media.
We continue with a joint analysis detailing the strategic depth Iran is holding. It ranges from the support of the Iranian populace for their leadership, cemented by the covert war to the (likely) unwavering support of Russia and China.
We end with the speculation of why President Trump seems to hellbent to attack Iran. The Grand (Unified) Geopolitical Theory, which first part we published four weeks ago, implies that the war, if it comes, is not about oil or even Iranian enrichment, but on the strategic role Iran holds, not just in the Middle East but also globally.
Tuomas
Why the Persian Gulf theater is highly unfavorable to the U.S. in any conflict with Iran
By Patricia Marins
The problem for President Trump is not the number of American ships sent to intimidate Iran. The real issue is the theater of operations itself, its geography, bathymetry, and the asymmetric force Iran has deliberately built to exploit them.
Shallow and Confined Waters
The Persian Gulf is one of the shallowest seas on the planet, with an average depth of just 35–50 meters and a maximum of about 120 meters near the Strait of Hormuz. These shallow, high-salinity, and high-temperature conditions create a challenging, noisy, and complex environment for sonar, favoring small, fast, and highly maneuverable platforms. The Gulf of Oman is deeper; however, along the Iranian coast remains relatively shallow, with depths averaging around 200 m, with Iran operating 5-6 larger submarines (Kilo and Fateh classes) in those waters and in Arabian sea.
A U.S. Carrier Strike Group (CSG) cannot operate inside these gulfs without extreme risk. Even if positioned 1,500 km offshore in the Arabian Sea, American ships remain within range of Iranian missiles, submarines, and drones. To project power, they must pass through the narrow, shallow choke point of Hormuz, precisely where Iran has concentrated its asymmetric assets. Without closing that distance, carrier-based aircraft lack the range to strike Iran’s major cities, including Tehran.
Iran’s “Mosquito Fleet” - Speedboats and Catamarans
Iran operates at least 1,500 fast attack craft, many displacing less than 10 tons and capable of 50-110 knots. Roughly 250–300 are armed with modern anti-ship missiles (Nasr, Kowsar, Ghader, Zafar). These vessels were designed for classic “swarm” tactics: rapid hit-and-run attacks, saturation strikes, and suicide missions. The U.S. Navy has not faced this kind of strategy since World War II.
Catamarans of Iran are equipped with 16 vertical launch cells for air-defense systems with ranges exceeding 100 km. Some Zulfiqar-class speedboats are also dedicated to air defense.
Submarines Optimized for Littoral Warfare
Iran possesses one of the largest and most diverse submarine fleets in the Middle East - an estimated 28-30 boats. About 20 of them are Ghadir-class midget submarines: extremely quiet in shallow water, capable of laying mines, launching torpedoes, and firing submerged anti-ship missiles. Like the fast boats, they can resupply at any small pier if their main bases are destroyed.
These 20+ mini-submarines turn the shallow waters into a lethal ambush zone. Large U.S. submarines (Ohio or Virginia class) would struggle to maneuver and could be hunted by dozens of stealthy mini-subs. In the deeper waters of the Gulf of Oman, American forces would still face the 5-6 larger Fateh and Kilo-class boats.
Unmanned Systems
UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles)
Iran has invested heavily in unmanned underwater systems, ranging from the Nazir-1 and Nazir-5 to a sophisticated XLUUV (Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle) model, which Iranian officials claim is comparable to the U.S. Navy’s Orca.
Furthermore, Iran has invested heavily in torpedo-shaped UUVs. These hybrid weapons can loiter for extended periods, are remotely guided, and are designed to attack stationary or slow-moving targets. Their range and endurance far exceed those of conventional torpedoes, making them particularly dangerous in confined waters.
USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles)
Iran has demonstrated explosive unmanned surface vessels and swarm tactics, often operating alongside manned speedboats. It has also supplied several models to the Houthis. There are dozens of variants, some AI-equipped, reaching speeds over 120 km/h and ranges of several hundred kilometers.
UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles)
Iran currently deploys approximately 20 distinct drone models, with the Shahed-136B standing out due to its significantly upgraded range of up to 4,000 km. Other pivotal systems include the Shahed-149 ‘Gaza’, the Ababil, and the Mohajer series, which are essential for ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and coordinating anti-ship strikes. Additionally, the Karrar serves as a versatile platform capable of carrying air-to-air missiles for aerial engagements. By leveraging these low-cost, high-endurance systems, Iran can effectively saturate enemy defenses with minimal financial investment.
U.S. Bases Are Dangerously Exposed
Most American forward bases lie perilously close to Iran. Al-Udeid Air Base (Qatar) is less than 300 km from the Iranian coast (a facility that cost roughly $10 billion). The U.S. 5th Fleet headquarters (Bahrain) is just over 200 km from Iranian territory. The bases held a highly detrimental position in an all-out conflict as Iran has large stocks of older missiles with a range of 300 km. Iran could use them to overwhelm Patriot batteries. Moreover, bases in the UAE, Kuwait, and eastern Saudi Arabia are all within 700 km, well inside the range of Iranian short range missiles and thousands of drones. In case of conflict, it would become impossible to operate these bases, considerably reducing logistical capacity.
Long-Range “Stand-Off” Attacks Are Practically Impossible
Operating from a safe distance (e.g., 1,000 km offshore in the Arabian Sea), carrier aircraft (F/A-18 Super Hornet, F-35C) lack the combat radius to reach deep into Iran, especially Tehran. Aerial refueling would require tankers operating in contested airspace, a high-risk proposition. Even Tomahawk missiles (standard range 1,600–1,700 km, extendable to 2,500 km in some variants) would struggle to hit Tehran from that distance, forcing ships closer to the coast and into greater danger.
There is no realistic scenario of a “limited strike and quick withdrawal.” Iran’s military-industrial base, hardened by decades of sanctions, is built for a prolonged war. Its forces were specifically designed for this environment: shallow waters, short interior lines of communication, and vast numbers of cheap, distributed weapons.
Tehran lies nearly 1,000 km from the coast, far beyond the easy reach of carrier-based aircraft without deep penetration into hostile airspace. The only way to heavily strike the capital would be from bases in Azerbaijan, as Israel appears to have done on two occasions.
Antiship Missiles
Above 700 km
Iran has developed and fielded multiple long-range anti-ship missiles capable of striking targets well beyond the Persian Gulf and into the Arabian Sea.
The three main systems include the Abu Mahdi, a turbojet-powered, sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missile with a confirmed range exceeding 1,000 km. In 2023 the IRGC Navy announced versions reaching 2,000 km and up to 2,600 km in submarine-launched variants. The Qadr-474, is an advanced ship-launched anti-ship cruise missile with a range of 2,000 km, already equipped on IRGC Navy vessels including the Shahid Mahdaviand Shahid Soleimani classes. And, third, the Zolfaghar Basir, an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range exceeding 700 km (some sources claim up to 1,000 km when ship-launched), equipped with an optical seeker optimized for moving ships and launched from mobile coastal or island platforms.
Hypersonic and Long-Range Ballistic Systems for Naval Strike
Iran has adapted and tested several long-range ballistic missiles in the anti-ship role, as the Emad (1,700 km), Ghadr (2,000 km), the Fattah-2, a hypersonic glide vehicle variant with claimed range up to 2,000 km and the Sejji variants(2,500 km). Some were fired more than 1,800 km into the Indian Ocean against simulated naval targets during Great Prophet 15 (January 2021) while a U.S. carrier strike group was in the area.
The Iran-China-Russia(-Strait) Play
With Patricia Marins
In the above-described environment, a naval battle heavily favors Iran. Large U.S. surface ships would face a “swarm of mosquitoes” threat the U.S. Navy has not confronted in decades. The risk of significant casualties is high. Even a successful initial strike would likely be followed by rapid Iranian reconstitution, supported most likely by China and Russia, leaving the regime intact and its stock of enriched uranium (currently reportedly 440 kg) still in its hands. Only a large-scale ground operation would be sufficient to deliver the “strategic goals” the U.S. president has asserted (we return to these below).
The information Tuomas received from his Finnish-Iranian contact at the end of last week indicates that the momentum is changing in favor of Tehran. The country stands united with its leadership enjoying support it has not seen in decades. This forms a notable “strategic” support for the Iranian leadership to act as it sees fit against any foreign or domestic enemy. In addition, there are two strategical aspects supporting the Iranian regime.
